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The Use and Misuse of
Interstate Tax Comparisons
RICHARD D. POMP*
Interstate comparisons of the tax burdens imposed on corporations and
individuals have become a standard feature of debates over state tax pol-
icy.' Too often, however, these studies have been used without any can-
did discussion of their inherent weaknesses. This lack of discussion is
unfortunate, because the utility of interstate tax comparisons for state pol-
icy makers is problematic; serious questions can be raised concerning their
use and abuse.2
This article provides a framework for evaluating interstate tax compar-
isons. The first section discusses the role of these comparative studies in
formulating tax policy. The second section criticizes some of the meas-
ures that are commonly used in comparing the tax burdens of the states.
The article concludes by recommending two approaches that attempt to
eliminate some of the limitations that characterize tax burden studies.
Uses and Misuses of Comparisons
Are Taxes 7bo High or 7bo Low?
One of the most common uses made of interstate comparisons is to
answer the question whether taxes paid by individuals or businesses are
"too high!' Although it is simple to state, this question is exceedingly
difficult to answer. In the abstract, it is easy to agree that taxes are too
high. Who would not like a tax reduction? On a more concrete level, how-
ever, the relevant inquiry is whether the amount of taxes paid represents
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fair value for the level of governmental goods, services, and transfer pay-
ments received by a state's residents. More specifically, how does the level
of taxation compare with the quantity and quality of the goods, services,
and transfer payments that such taxes finance? How do these goods and
services compare with those that are desired by the electorate? If taxes
were lowered, what would be the impact, if any, on the quality of life in
a state?
These are critical questions in determining whether taxes are too high,
but not ones that are explicitly addressed by interstate tax comparisons.3
By their nature, such comparisons deal with only the revenue-raising side
of the budget, not with the spending side. Thus, those comparisons pro-
vide an incomplete picture.
To begin with, differences in taxes might reflect differences in the scope
or quality of governmental goods, services, and transfer payments. State
and local governments differ from each other in terms of their size, loca-
tion, demographics (e.g., population density, the number of families below
the poverty level, and the number of elderly), degree of urbanization, com-
mercial development, tax bases, and social philosophy. It is not surpris-
ing to find that residents of jurisdiction X prefer a higher level of goods,
services, or transfer payments than do residents of jurisdiction Y. A study
can determine that taxes are higher in X than in Y, but, on this basis, no
inference could be drawn that taxes are too high in X. After all, "taxes
are what we pay for civilized society,"4 and jurisdictions differ in their
views about what constitutes a civilized or just society.
Second, differences among states in levels of taxation might reflect differ-
ences of nomenclature, not differences in the scope or quality of govern-
mental goods and services. For example, residents of jurisdiction X might
"pay" for garbage collection, water, or sewerage through their property
taxes, whereas residents of jurisdiction Y might pay for a similar level of
services through user charges paid to either the public or the private sec-
tor. Thus, although the taxes of X might be higher than those of Y, there
might be no difference between the two jurisdictions in point of expend-
iture.
Finally, differences in taxation might represent differences among the
states in the cost of government. Residents of state X might pay more in
taxes than do residents of state Y for the same level of goods and services
because state X pays more to provide those services than does state Y.
Costs can vary among states because of differences in climate, topogra-
phy, demographics, age and condition of the infrastructure, degree of
urbanization, or amount of bureaucratic waste and inefficiency. For exam-
ple, the cost of maintaining a highway in a state that is subject to extremes
in weather conditions is likely to be greater than that in a state having
a temperate and more stable climate.
journal of State 7hzxation [Vol. 5:2]
Another problem in providing a satisfactory answer to the question
whether taxes are too high is specifying on whose behalf the question is
being asked. For example, is it being asked whether taxes are too high for
individuals or whether they are too high for corporations? If the former,
what types of individuals are of concern? Commuters? Retired persons?
Chief executive officers? Middle management? Blue-collar workers? Young
professionals? People living at the poverty level? Taxpayers with capital
gains, interest, or dividends? Married couples with two incomes?5 Or,
which corporations are of concern? Multistate corporations or intrastate
corporations? Capital-intensive or labor-intensive corporations? Those that
are part of a family of related corporations? Corporations selling primar-
ily within or outside the state? Those that lease rather than own their prop-
erty? As various studies have made abundantly clear,6 a state tax structure
can treat taxpayers with the same economic income very differently, so
that the "too high" question cannot be answered without clearly defining
the taxpayer. Put differently, the taxpayers of interest vary depending on
why policymakers are asking this question.
Even after the relevant individuals or corporations are defined, studies
of comparative tax burdens cannot answer the question whether taxes are
too high relative to the quantity and quality of publicly provided goods,
services, and transfer payments. Taxes represent only one-half of that ques-
tion. Because the other half of the question-that requiring a comparison
of the level and quality of government expenditures-presents significant
methodological difficulties, the temptation is to focus on only the tax side
of the question. Nevertheless, a systematic analysis of public expenditures
is required before the "too high" question can be satisfactorily answered.
Interstate comparisons are sometimes used to determine whether taxes
are "too low." Typically, the "too low" question is phrased in terms of
whether an underutilized source of revenue exists. To be sure, in some
cases, the underutilization of a tax base represents a conscious policy deci-
sion, such as that resulting in the lack of a broad-based income tax in Con-
necticut. 7 In other cases, however, policymakers in one state may be
unawatc that they are relying less heavily upon a particular tax base than
are their counterparts in neighboring states. In any event, the 'too low"
question raises the same types of issues raised by the "too high" question.
Are Taxes Discouraging Economic Development?
A second use of tax comparisons is to determine the effect of a state's
tax system on attracting and maintaining businesses and their employees-
an issue that is related to the "too high" (or "too low") question. Numer-
ous and complex factors influence a business's decision on where to locate.
In addition to taxes, these factors include: the cost of real estate, labor,
raw materials, transportation, and energy; the condition of a state's
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infrastructure-particularly, that of its schools and highways; the location
of a business's market; and the quality of life that a state offers to execu-
tives and other employees. A state with low taxes may actually be unat-
tractive to businesses and individuals if low taxes reflect an inadequate
supply of those public goods and services that firms and their employees
value. Indeed, taxpayers in various parts of the country have actually urged
tax increases to finance education reforms8 in attempts to attract businesses
and their employees. Furthermore, if a low level of public goods and serv-
ices in state'Y results in businesses' having to provide for themselves what
is publicly provided in state X, any advantages of Y's lower taxes may
be offset b its higher costs of doing business.9
The factors that influence the location decisions of businesses have been
studied by economists for -at least 30 years. Much of the evidence raises
serious questions regarding whether state business taxes play a signifi-
cant role in location decisions.10 Perhaps for this reason, attention has
recently turned to the role played by a state's personal income tax.
The level of a state's personal income tax can indirectly affect a busi-
ness's location decision in at least three ways. First, it might influence
the decision of a corporation's chief executive officer to live in neighbor-
ing state Y rather than in state X, and the residence of the executive might
influence a subsequent decision regarding the place where the business
might expand or relocate. Second, for similar reasons, the level of taxa-
tion might discourage rank-and-file employees from living in state X.
Unless workers are willing to commute from Y to X, the latter state may
lack the labor pool necessary to attract certain businesses. Third, high per-
sonal income taxes might be reflected in higher wages; the increased cost
of labor might make a state with such taxes less attractive to businesses.
At present, no rigorous empirical data exist that provide much insight
into these issues. Furthermore, without an analysis of a state's public serv-
ices and the whole panoply of factors that are embodied in the notation
of "quality of life," comparisons of income tax levels are of limited utility,
especially if a state's low income taxes are offset by a heavy reliance on
other taxes."
Are Taxes Out of Line With Those of Other States?
A third use made of interstate comparisons is to determine whether a
state is out of line with other states because its taxes are too high (or too
low). As a matter of logic, a state can be out of line either because its taxes
are too high (or too low) or because the taxes in other states are too low
(or too high). In many cases, however, raising this issue is a way of asking
whether a state's taxes are too high and expressing concern over the neg-
ative impact that the tax system might be having on a state's economy.
In other cases, it is a way of identifying a potentially underutilized tax base.
journal of State Taxation [Vol. 5:2]
Occasionally, the "out of line" argument is used as evidence of waste
or inefficiency in government. For example, if the taxes of state X are higher
than those of state Y but taxpayers in X receive less in governmental goods
and services than do taxpayers in Y, the difference might be attributable
to waste and inefficiency. Before this conclusion can be reached, how-
ever, differences in the cost and quality of governmental goods and serv-
ices and the reliance on user charges need to be explored.
Are Taxes Fairly Distributed?
A fourth, less frequent, use of interstate tax comparisons is to evaluate
the fairness of the distribution of a state's tax burden. This inquiry has
at least two aspects: the distribution of the tax burden between businesses
and individuals, and the distribution of tax burdens among individuals
or businesses. Theoretically, issues of fairness involve value judgments
that should be independent of those reached by other states. Realistically,
however, some constraints are imposed on policymakers. For example,
many persons view a progressive tax as a fair tax. A conflict may arise,
however, between the progressivity of a state tax system and the need
to attract businesses and employees. At some point, a state tax system may
be so progressive that it encourages middle- and high-income persons to
live elsewhere, a consideration that may be especially relevant for states
having metropolitan areas located within commuting distance from other
stats. LC', lary, a state is iot unconstrained in the proportion of its taxes
that it can raise from businesses' 2 Ultimately, however, the economic
effects-of how a state distributes its tax burden cannot be determined with-
out taking into account the identity of those who benefit from the provi-
sion of public goods and services.
Commonly Used Measures
The first section of this article focused on the uses and limitations of
studies comparing tax burdens among the states. For the purpose of that
discussion, it is unnecessary to examine how the tax burdens were deter-
mined. The usefulness of a comparative study of tax burdens, however,
depends upon the questions that such a study is intended to answer and
the merits of the methodology used.
In the context of state debates over tax policy, the most commonly asked
questions are whether a state's taxes are too high (or too low) and whether
the level of taxation has harmed (or helped) the economy. The traditional
approaches to answering these questions can differ, depending on whether
the tax comparisons are for individuals or corporations. This section dis-
cusses three measures that are especially common in comparing the taxes
on individuals:
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1. Taxes per capita: the dollar amount of total tax collections divided
by the population of a state;
2. Taxes as a percentage of personal income: the percentage resulting
from dividing the dollar amount of total tax collections by the per-
sonal income of a state's residents; and
3. The representative tax system capacity and effort index: an index
developed by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions that is intended to measure the extent to which a state is exploit-
ing its tax base.
These three approaches have become conventi6nal measures of inter-
state tax burdens of individuals because they provide a consistent method
of comparison and are easier to summarize and use than other, more
sophisticated, measures. Each of these approaches, however, has serious
limitations. As usual, a trade-off exists between simplicity and accuracy;
the simpler the measure, the less information it typically conveys. After
discussing these three conventional measures of personal income taxes,
this section concludes with a discussion of those approaches that are com-
monly used for comparing the tax burdens of businesses.
The thesis of this section is that the most commonly used measures of
interstate tax burdens do not provide a very -useful basis upon which to
formulate state tax policy. These measures are inadequate because they
encourage policymakers and the public to use imprecise and broad gener-
alizations instead of more precise and meaningful approaches. Two exam-
ples of the latter sort of approach are described in the next section.
Taxes per Capita
The measurement of taxes' 3 per capita is one of the most commonly
used methods of determining tax burden because it is so easy to perform
and understand. Unfortunately, it is also one of the least meaningful of
all measures.j4 States with the same population may be very different in
other critical respects that bear directly on the ability of their residents
to pay taxes. Such a measurement ignores these other aspects and treats
each; member of a state's population identically, regardless of age, wealth,
income, employment status, and marital or family status.
For example, assume that both state A and state B collect$4,000 in taxes
and that each state has four residents. Each resident in state A is employed
and single, whereas the residents in State B consist of a family of four,
with one wage earner. Assume that both states have identical tax systems.
Because both states collect the same amount in tax and have the same
population, they have identical measures of taxes per capita ($4,000/4 =
$1,000). The identical per capita measure, however, ignores the fact that
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As revenue is derived from four members of the work force, whereas B's
revenue is derived from one family, which has only one wage earner.
More generally, because the measure of taxes per capita is an aggregate
measure, it provides no information about the specific tax burdens of par-
ticular taxpayers. The measure reduces the entire state tax system, with
all of its complexities and nuances,15 and the entire population, with all
of its diversity, to one simple ratio. Such a measure cannot provide infor-
mation about what kinds of persons or entities pay what kinds of taxes,
and cannot capture differences in taxpayers' ability to pay.
Another way in which the per capita measure is weak is that it ignores
the "incidence" of taxation-that is, the ultimate resting place of a tax,
which can be very different from the person that pays the tax initially.
For example, if the corporate income tax reduces the amount of dividends
paid by the corporation, the incidence of the tax falls on shareholders.
If, however, the corporation increases the price of its products by the
amount of the tax, the incidence of the tax falls on consumers. Other inci-
dence effects (or combinations of effects) are also possible. Moreover, deter-
mining the incidence of the tax is even more complicated, because
shareholders (or consumers) adjust their behavior in response to their
lowered dividends (or higher prices), and these adjustments have further
economic repercussions. The taxes per capita measure assumes that the
incidence of a state tax falls on the person who pays it. A realistic appraisal
of the distribution of the tax burden, however, requires a determination
of the ultimate incidence of a tax.
The taxes per capita measure ignores the ability of a state to export its
taxes to residents of other states. For example, if a state corporate income
tax reduces the amount of dividends paid, the tax falls on shareholders.
But, some of these shareholders might not reside within the taxing state.
Similarly, some of the consumers on whom a tax falls by dint of the
increased price of a corporation's products might also reside in other states.
Consider the fact that Alaska consistently ranks near the top when states
are ordered on the basis of their taxes per capita. This high ranking, how-
ever, reflects Alaska's heavy reliance on the taxation of oil-taxes that,
presumably, are paid by nonresidents. Furthermore, tax exporting is not
limited to business taxes; other types of taxes can also fall on nonresidents.
Part of a state's sales tax, for example, is collected from nonresidents-for
exampl , commuters, business visitors, and tourists.
Conversely, the measurement of taxes per capita ignores tax importing.
Taxes exported domestically by one state represent taxes that are imported
by the residents of other states. A complete assessment of the level and
distribution of tax burdens requires knowing not only which taxes are
exported to nonresidents, but also which taxes are imported from other
states.16
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Yet another weakness of the taxes per capita measure is its failure to
account for the federal offset. Because state and local taxes are an itemized
deduction for purposes of the personal income tax' 7 their out-of-pocket
cost is reduced by the savings that result from the concomitant decrease
in the federal tax. For every $100 in state and local taxes that are deducted,
a taxpayer subject to a federal marginal tax rate of 50% saves $50 ($100
x 50%) in federal taxes. Because state and local taxes are deductible only
by taxpayers who itemize, the taxes per capita measure overstates the tax
burden in such states as New York, which has a disproportionately large
number of itemizers.
Taxes as a Percent of Income
The measurement of taxes as a percent of personal income is another
method commonly used in interstate tax comparisons. By dividing taxes'5
by the aggregate personal income of the residents of a state, this measure
attempts to improve upon the taxes per capita measurement, which ignores
such income. As a straightforward illustration of the differences between
the measurement of taxes per capita and that of taxes as a percent of
income (often expressed as taxes per $1,000 of income), assume that state
A has four residents, each earning $10,000, and that state B has four resi-
dents, each earning $100,000. States A and B both collect $4,000 in taxes.
The per capita burdens of the two states are the same-$1,000 ($4,000/4)-
suggesting that the burdens on the taxpayers in each state are similar. How-
ever, taxes expressed as a percent of personal income are quite different:
$100 per $1,000 personal income for state A [($4,000/$40,000) x $1,000]
and $10 per $1,000 personal income for state B [($4,000/$400,000) x
$ 1,000].
Although it is an improvement over taxes per capita as a measure of
tax burden, the- measurement of taxes as a percent of personal income
shares many of the problems discusseid above. It ignores the incidence
of a tax, the federal offset, issues of tax exporting and importing, and how
the burden of the tax is distributed among income groups. An additional
problem involves the definition of income. There is a lack of accurate data
on a comprehensive measure of economic income. Among the possible
measures of income, none of which is comprehensive, are money income,
resident personal income, disposable personal income, income by place
of work, adjusted' gross income, and taxable income. 9 The differences
among these measures can be significant. 20
Another weakness of this method is that it assumes that the numerator
of the measure, tax collections, and the denominator, personal income,
are independent of each other. In many cases, however, this assumption
is weak. For example, some of the personal income included in the denomi-
nator is paid out of tax revenues (e.g., the salaries of state employees). More
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significantly, government spending has a multiplier effect-that is, money
spent by the state for public purposes flows through the economy, gener-
ating additional income. The government expenditure multiplier depends
on the amount of government expenditures, the mix of public and pri-
vate employment, and the types of goods and services purchased by the
government; it is therefore likely to vary from state to state. Unfortunately,
none of the measures of tax burden can easily incorporate this multiplier
effect.
The Representative Tax System
The representative tax system (RTS), developed by the Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), uses three measures of
interstate tax comparisons:
1. Tax capacity, which is intended to represent a state's overall ability
to raise revenue, not to measure tax burdens;
2. Tax effort, which is intended to represent the degree to which a state
exploits its tax capacity and is used by some groups as a measure
of tax burden; and
3. Fiscal pressure, which compares the tax effort index to the rate of
change in that index over a recent period of time.
The ACIR developed the RTS for use in federal grant-in-aid formulas
that are intpnded to provide some fiscal equalization. Nonetheless, the
ACIR recognizes that the RTS has had a wide appeal among those monitor-
ing state and local tax trends and suggests that the RTS can be used by
officials who are interested in making comparisons between their states
and others.2' The following subsections analyze separately the concepts
of tax capacity, tax effort, and fiscal pressure; however, the latter two are
based on the former and thus are derivative concepts, and incorporate
all of its limitations.
Tax Capacity: The concept of tax capacity, or a government's ability
to raise revenue, is not new. The issue of measuring tax capacity first arose
in the United States in the debate over allocating the expenses of the
national government among the states when the Articles of Confedera-
tion were being drafted.2 2 More recently, formulas used for distributing
certain grants-for example, general revenue sharing, Medicaid, and Aid
to Families with Dependent Children 2 3-among the states have incorpo-
rated this concept.
Several federal aid programs use per capita income as a proxy for fiscal
capacity. This measure shares many of the weaknesses of the taxes per
capita measure discussed above. Tax capacity as used by the RTS replaces
per capita income with a more sophisticated approach. The RTS calcu-
lates tax capacity by estimating the hypothetical amount of revenue that
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each state would raise if it were to apply a nationally uniform set of tax
rates. The rates used in the calculation are "representative" because they
are national averages for each type of tax. Differences in estimated tax
yields among the states calculated on the basis of the RTS reflect only the
differences in state and local tax bases. Tax capacity thus pertains only
to the amount of economic resources in a state that is potentially taxable,
regardless of whether, or at what rates, such resources are actually taxed.
The ACIR has developed a "tax capacity index" which compares each
state's per capita tax capacity to the average for all states. An index of 100
is the average. These tax capacity indices provide a measure for compar-
ing the states' tax profiles. For example, according to the ACIR, a state
with an index of greater than 100 has more ability to raise revenue than
does the "average" or "representative" state; an index of less than 100 rep-
resents a below-average ability to raise revenue.24
The concept of tax capacity and the ACIR's tax capacity index are often
used in studies of tax systems. Although some measure akin to tax capac-
ity is no doubt required when federal money is being distributed among
the states-and the ACIR deserves credit for improving upon earlier
measures-the concept has at least eight weaknesses that limit its useful-
ness for purposes of formulating state tax policy.
First, the tax capacity index is not independent of changes in state tax
rates or structures. Consider, for example, that the average national per-
sonal income tax rate reflects Connecticut's lack of a personal income tax
on earned income. If Connecticut were to adopt a broad-based income
tax, its action would increase the average national rate of personal income
taxation and, thus, the tax capacity of other states. However, taxpayers
in these other states would not experience any increase in their economic
well-being or ability to pay because of Connecticut's action.
As another example, consider that the average rate of sales tax is de-
rived by dividing the amount collected under all state and local sales taxes
by the amount of retail sales and receipts from selected services. 25 If one
state were to increase its sales tax, or institute a sales tax for the first time,
total collections would increase, thus increasing both the average rate of
sales tax used by the RTS and the tax capacity of the other states.
Second, the ACIR methodology ignores the interrelated nature of the
various tax bases. For example, the RTS measures the capacity of a state
to tax property based on the aggregate value of property. State A and state
B can have identical property values and, therefore, identical property tax
capacities without having identical abilities to tax property.26 If the resi-
dents of state A have higher incomes than do the residents of state B, A
can impose higher property tax rates. It tnerefore has a greater capacity
to tax property than does B, if it is assumed that property taxes are paid
Journal of State Taxation [Vol. 5:2]
out of current income. If A taxed income more heavily than did B, how-
ever, its capacity to tax property would be less than B's. 2 7
Third, the size of a state's tax base may not be independent of a state's
choice of rates. New Hampshire, for example, has a high capacity to tax
liquor (as measured by its high per capita liquor sales) and a low tax rate.
One of the reasons it might have a high capacity, however, is because its
rates are low relative to its neighboring states, which helps attract out-of-
state consumers. Its capacity to tax liquor might "dry up" if the state
attempted to exploit this capacity by increasing its rates.2 8
Fourth, the RTS seeks to answer the question of how much revenue each
state could generate if it used the national average rates. However, it is
unclear what economic effects would occur if all states were to impose
taxes at the national average rate for each tax included in the RTS. It is
quite possible that no state would raise the revenue suggested by the RTS.29
Fifth, in order to update the RTS more quickly, the ACIR has simplified
its methodology, which has reduced the value of the end product. For
example, data on state and local jurisdictions were merged in 1973 so that
there are no independent estimates for local jurisdictions. 30 Such estimates
may be particularly relevant in such states as New York, where the inter-
action of state and local taxes presents policymakers with the problem
of being able to increase local taxes only if revenue sharing between the
state and its localities is decreased.
Sixth, despite simplifications in the RTS methodology, serious measure-
ment difficulties remain. Residential property values, for instance, are
reported by the Census Bureau every five years, and the techniques avail-
able for extrapolating the values for intervening years are less than per-
fect.31 For example, if property values in an urban area during the late
1960s had been estimated by a linear regression based upon data for the
preceding years, the property values would have been overstated because
of the migration to the suburbs. Conversely, property values in suburban
areas would have been understated.
Seventh, a methodological problem arises because each tax base used
by the RTS must be determined on a state-by-state basis. In some cases,
the information needed to make this determination does not exist. For
example, the RTS includes the corporate income tax. In order to answer
the question of how much revenue a state would raise by levying the aver-
age national rate, it must first be determined how much corporate income
is allocated to that state. States typically use an equally weighted three-
factor formula-one-third payroll, one-third property, and one-third sales
by destination-to allocate a corporation's income. However, state-specific
data on corporate property and sales are not available. Because state-
specific information on payroll is available, the RTS assumes that prop-
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erty is distributed in the same fashion as is payroll. To estimate sales by
state, a national input-output table is used. It is unclear whether this
approach is accurate.
Finally, the concept of tax capacity is open to misinterpretation. The
nomenclature may suggest some fixed ability to raise revenue that is
beyond the control of the state. This interpretation is incorrect, however,
because deliberate government action can affect the size of a state's tax
base. Zoning laws, for example, can affect the value of property. The legali-
zation of gambling can provide a base for parimutuel taxes that previously
did not exist, as well as increasing revenue from taxes on amusements
and liquor.3 2 The point is not that a state should pursue these actions, but
only that, to some extent, a state's tax capacity is not immutable, and can
be increased (or decreased) through its laws.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the ACIR's approach is a marked
improvement over the less-sophisticated measures currently used for dis-
tributing federal grants. Once a decision is made to distribute funds, legis-
lators must have some means for determining how much each state should
receive, and the ACIR's work helps rationalize the programs of federal
grants. What role the RTS can play for state tax policymakers, however,
is less obvious. As the ACIR very carefully noted:
The use of a representative set of tax rates for capacity measurement
in no way implies that a state should use the representative rates in
practice.... The common set of tax rates used by the RTS reflects
the typical behavior of all states and is not meant to be ideal or prescrip-
tive.33
Despite its shortcomings. the RTS is a fertile source of data for tax
policymakers, and is useful in identifying national or regional trends.
Tax Effort: A measure that complements the RTS tax capacity index is
that of "tax effort.' Whereas tax capacity concerns the relative size of a
state's potential tax base, tax effort pertains to the degree to which the
aggregate tax base is "exploited.' Mathematically, a state's tax effort is the
ratio of its actual tax collections to its tax capacity.3 4 The ACIR has created
a tax effort index by dividing each state's tax effort by the average for all
states. An index of 100 is average.
A tax effort factor can be used in intergovernmental aid formulas, and
the RTS approach is an improvement over less sophisticated measures.
However, tax effort determinations are sometimes used as a measure of
a state's tax burden-although, for the following reasons, the concept of
tax effort is ill-suited to this type of use.
To begin with, the concept is derived from the RTS concept of the tax
capacity of a state. Consequently, it suffers from all of the weaknesses
inherent to this latter concept. Second, tax effort measurements do not
adjust for tax exporting. A high tax effort does not translate into a large
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burden on residents if the taxes are shifted to nonresidents. By relying
heavily on taxes that can be shifted, a state may not have to so rely on
its other tax bases.35 Third, like all aggregate measures, tax effort meas-
urements are not intended to reflect the tax burdens of specific taxpayers.
Fourth, such measurements ignore the federal offset. Perhaps anticipat-
ing this misuse of the measurement, the ACIR warns that although the
concept is a useful device to compare state tax policies, it should not be
used to measure resident tax burdens.3 6
Fiscal Pressure: A third ACIR measure is the so-called fiscal blood pres-
sure index, a "two dimensional measure which provides a view of how
state tax efforts have changed over time, as well as their level at a given
point in time:'3 7 The measure is expressed as the ratio of the current tax
effort index to the tax effort index of a prior year. An index of 112/80,
for example, indicates that a state's effort is 12% above average and that
it has fallen by 20% since the previous year.3 8
The index was developed because it was thought that a static measure
of tax effort did not adequately portray a state's fiscal strain. According
to the ACIR, "the rate at which a state's tax effort is changing is a signifi-
cant indicator of state fiscal stress because it reflects how taxpayer bur-
dens are shifting.' [Emphasis added.]3 9 It is difficult, however, to reconcile
this description with the ACIR's earlier warning that tax effort, upon which
the fiscal blood pressure index is based, "fails to gauge accurately resi-
dent tax burdens." [Emphasis added.14°
Unlike the concepts of tax effort and tax capacity, the fiscal blood pres-
sure index was not developed by the ACIR in order to rationalize the proc-
ess by which the government distributes aid among the states. One of the
reasons that the weaknesses in the tax effort and tax capacity measures
are palatable is that some means must be developed for distributing fed-
eral grants as long as such funds exist. Certainly, a more sophisticated,
albeit imperfect, measure is preferable to a less sophisticated, and more
imperfect, measure. For purposes of state tax policy, however, the inevita-
ble weaknesses in the tax effort and tax capacity measures, which are
incorporated in the fiscal blood pressure measure, combined with the
limited role that interstate comparisons play, limit the utility of these con-
cepts in formulating state tax policy.
Special Measures Used for Businesses
There are three common methods of measuring the tax burden of busi-
nesses. The first employs aggregate data on tax collections, gross profits,
sales, and other items, and computes summary measures that might be
considered "average rates" of business taxation. Typical of this approach
is the ACIR's 1981 study, "Interstate Tax Competition' which measures
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the business tax burden in a state by dividing taxes having an initial impact
on business by total tax receipts. Many of the weaknesses discussed above
apply to this approach, and these weaknesses help obscure much of what
is of interest to policymakers.
The second approach focuses on the tax liabilities paid by a representa-
tive firm in a specific industry in each state. A one-year tax liability of
the firm is calculated, and the states are then ranked according to this
liability.
The third approach uses a computer model to simulate the tax treat-
ment over time of specific representative firms at different locations. In
order to isolate the effect of taxes alone, all other costs and revenue differ-
ences are held constant. The performance of each firm is simulated over
a period of time, assuming a constant before-tax rate of return at a num-
ber of alternative locations. The after-tax rate of return is then calculated
for each firm at each alternative location. Variations in after-tax rates of
return are attributable solely to differences in tax treatment at the vari-
ous locations. For reasons discussed below, the use of after-tax rates of
return has significant advantages over the other approaches.
Preferred Approaches to Interstate Tax Comparisons
Although the utility of interstate tax comparisons as ends in themselves
is debatable, such comparisons are a necessary step in answering some
of the more fundamental questions discussed in the first section of this
article. Accordingly, they should be conducted as rigorously as possible.
Advanced computer technology and a generally greater level of techni-
cal sophistication have allowed researchers to improve upon the earlier
types of comparisons discussed above. This section sketches two ap-
proaches to measuring tax burdens on corporations and individuals: tax-
payer profiles for individuals, and after-tax rates of return for corporations.
Although each approach has its own weaknesses, both hold the promise
of facilitating more meaningful and better-refined comparisons.
Taxpayer Profiles
The use of taxpayer profiles allows a precise comparison of specifically
defined taxpayers. Under this approach, samples of target taxpayers of
particular interest to policymakers are identified-for example, young
professionals, chief executive officers, retired couples, dual-income fami-
lies, and commuters. Using state-specific data based on tax returns filed
with the taxing state or IRS, or those based on other sources, the compo-
sition of the average target taxpayer's income (e.g., wages, capital gains,
and pensions) and deductions (e.g., interest, medical expenses, and local
taxes) at different income levels is determined. The items of income and
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deductions for each taxpayer at each income level constitute the "taxpayer
profile.' The state and local income, sales, and property taxes paid by the
representative taxpayers at locations in the taxing state and outside the
state are then calculated and compared.41 The federal income taxes paid
by these taxpayers are calculated and the savings resulting from the deduc-
tion of state and local taxes-the federal offset-are also calculated. The
amount of state and local taxes is reduced by the federal offset. The net
out-of-pocket cost of state and local taxes can then be compared for all
taxpayers at all sites. The computations of federal and state income taxes
can be performed easily using commercially available software.42
The taxpayer profile approach has a number of significant advantages
over the methods that rely more heavily on aggregate measures (e.g., meas-
urements of taxes per capita, tax effort, and taxes per $1,000 of income).
Tax systems usually contain a plethora of special exemptions, exclusions,
deductions, and credits that affect taxpayers differently. For each tax
imposed, states employ their own definitions of the tax base and their own
rate structures. The large variance in tax bases and rate structures is most
graphic in the case of personal income taxes: States differ in their taxa-
tion of such items as capital gains, pension income, deductions allowable
for business and personal expenses, provisions for personal allowances
and exemptions, and availability of joint returns for married couples. Rate
schedules illustrate similar diversity: States differ in their reliance on flat
rates, mildly progressive rates, sharply progressive rates, and separate rates
for earned and unearned income. Starting rates, top rates, and bracket
widths also vary.
To be meaningful for comparing tax burdens, interstate studies of per-
sonal income taxes require a detailed description of such items as a tax-
payer's income and deductions, marital status, and size of family.
Consequently, a significant advantage of the taxpayer profiles is that they
include a variety of taxpayers, with different amounts and composition
of income and deductions, and different marital and family characteris-
tics. This approach provides insight into how taxpayers in different eco-
nomic circumstances are affected by state and local tax structures.43
A second advantage is that the taxpayer profiles include sales and prop-
erty taxes, as well as income tax. Some studies focus only on the personal
income tax, which can be misleading in such states as Connecticut, where
the lack of a broad-based income tax results in that state's heavy reliance
on property and sales taxes.
Another advantage of the taxpayer profile approach is that it reflects
the effect of the federal offset. Because the federal offset mitigates some
of the interstate differences in taxation, its incorporation into any study
of comparative tax burdens is critical.
A recent study" employing the use of taxpayer profiles demonstrates
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the dangers of relying on oversimplified approaches for comparing the
tax burdens on individuals. The results of that study differed significantly
from those of othei studies using more aggregate measures. The differ-
ences, which were dramatic, suggested that meaningful comparisons
require a detailed description of items such as the composition of a tax-
payer's income, deductions, exemptions, marital status, sales taxes, and
property taxes. Relying on more aggregate approaches, such as measure-
ment of taxes per capita or taxes per $1,000 of income, can be misleading.45
After-Tax Rates of Return
Comparisons of firms based on their after-tax rates of return have at
least six major advantages over the two other common approaches dis-
cussed above-the use of average rates based on aggregate data, and the
use of one-year tax liabilities. First, the use of after-tax rates of return allows
tax differentials to be completely isolated from other factors that may
influence a firm's profitability. This approach allows a state or a firm to
determine how significant other cost advantages have to be to overcome
a tax disadvantage (or vice versa). Because the more aggregate studies can-
not isolate tax differentials, they present a less accurate picture.
For example, consider the studies that use total tax collections divided
by total business costs as their measure of tax burden. One problem with
this approach is that costs and profits vary extensively by state and by
industry. A high ratio of aggregate tax-to-business costs may not mean that
a state is taxing heavily relative to other states; it may simply mean that
nontax costs are low. A more fundamental defect in this approach, how-
ever, is that taxes and business costs are not always independent of each
other. If government-provided goods and services reduce costs that a cor-
poration would otherwise incur, a state with a high tax-to-cost ratio may
actually be ,a better place in which to do business than a state wth a low
tax-to-cost ratio.
Other studies compare business tax burdens by dividing business taxes
by total tax receipts, an approach that can also be misleading. The result-
ing ratio indichtes only the proportion of state taxes paid by businesses,
not the overall level of taxation. A state with a high ratio may actually
impose a lower tax on businesses than does a state with a low ratio. Finally,
any aggregate type of measure, whether taxes-to-business costs or busi-
ness taxes divided by total taxes, cannot possibly reflect the range of spe-
cial tax provisions that exemplify state tax structures. As one group of
researchers stated: "It makes little sense to talk of State A being a higher
taxing state than State B except in terms of particular firms and then only
in relation to specific marginal investments 46
A second major advantage of using after-tax rates of return is that this
method precisely captures the federal offset. For a firm subject to a 46%
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federal marginal rate, a $10,000 local property tax results in a net out-of-
pocket cost of only $5,400 [$10,000 - (46% x $10,000)]. Conversely, a
state investment tax credit of $10,000 increases a firm's after-tax profits
by only $5,400, not by the full amount of the credit. This interaction
between the federal corporate tax and state and local taxes is particularly
important when considering policy changes. Unless this interaction is con-
sidered, the benefits to the firm cannot be accurately weighed against any
revenue forgone.
Indeed, the federal offset highlights an inherent inefficiency in the use
of state tax incentives. By lowering a corporation's state taxes, a tax incen-
tive has the effect of increasing the corporation's federal taxes. For a cor-
poration subject to a 46% federal marginal tax bracket, every $100 of state
tax savings increases its federal taxes by $46. In other words, a state for-
goes $100 in tax revenue, but the corporation receives only $54 ($100 -
$46) in net benefit, with the federal government receiving $46 of increased
revenue. Put differently, to reduce a firm's taxes by $100, a state must
forgo $185 in taxes, with the federal government benefiting by $85. This
"reverse revenue sharing," which is inherent to state tax incentives, is fully
captured by the use of after-tax rates of return.47
Third, the use of after-tax rates of return helps determine whether tax
provisions may affect different firms in different ways. Firms earning iden-
tical before-tax profits may pay different taxes in the same jurisdiction.
Tax liabilities may vary with asset composition (personal versus real prop-
erty), the location of sales (in state or out of state), and the size of the firm.
As an example, the accelerated cost recovery system enacted into federai
law in 1981 provides significant advantages to firms with a large propor-
tion of their assets in depreciable property. "Decoupling," that is, not incor-
porating these federal changes into state tax law, thus affects some firms
more than it does others.48 Similarly, a New York-based manufacturing
firm that sells a substantial portion of its product out of state can take
advantage of New York's investment and employment tax credits,49 the
"double-weighted" receipts factor 50 in the business income allocation
(apportionment) formula, and the ability to allocate its income outside the
state, regardless of whether it has a regular place of business outside New
York. Another firm with identical profits will pay higher taxes if it sells
all of its output within the state or if it is ineligible for the investment
tax credit. In formulating state policy, it is important to know whether
the tax system favors or disfavors firms with particular characteristics or
those in specific industries. Unlike the more aggregate measures of cor-
porate tax burden, the use of after-tax rates of return is designed specifi-
cally to capture these differences.
Fourth, after-tax rates of return capture both the level and patterns of
tax liabilities over time. A firm contemplating a new investment is con-
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cerned not only with the taxes it will pay in the first year of its invest-
ment, but also with its tax liabilities over time. A one-year measure of tax
liability is misleading because taxes vary from year to year. A corporate
income tax, for example, is not paid during loss years (typically occurring
,during a start-up period), whereas property taxes are. The use of after-tax
rates of return readily accounts for the level, pattern, and duration of the
firm's tax liabilities.
Fifth, the effects of changes in the tax law on the profitability of firms
can be evaluated using after-tax rates of return. Changes in such
parameters as depreciation rates, allocation formulas, tax credits, and tax
rates can be simulated and the impact on profits-often surprisingly
small-can be measured.
Finally, a corporation considering a new investment in one state is con-
cerned with the effect of that investment on its tax liabilities in other states.
Because states divide up the income of a corporation in various ways for
income tax purposes, the taxes paid in state A can be affected by a corpo-
ration's expansion into state B. A calculation of after-tax rates of return
captures this interaction, whereas a one-year snapshot of the taxes paid
to state B doesnot.
Conclusion
The value of interstate tax burden comparisons for state policymakers
is limited. If such comparisons are made, they should be conducted in
a rigorous and meaningful manner. Methods better than the traditional
measures used to compare interstate tax burdens are currently avhilable.
The use of taxpayer profiles for comparing individuals and the use of after-
tax rates of return for comparing corporations offer significant advantages
over cruder methods or those that rely more heavily on aggregate meas-
ures, such as approaches based on taxes per capita, taxes as a percent of
income, or average rates of business taxation. The traditional approaches
might be useful in identifying broad trends over time, but that informa-
tion, by itself, may mask rather than expose critical issues.
The diversity and complexity of tax systems make it misleading to talk
about "the income tax" or "the franchise tax!' Most tax codes are the aggre-
gation of many tax codes, with rules that vary depending on the kind of
activity or investment, type of taxpayer, or composition of income and
deductions. Provisions that adversely affect certain taxpayers may bene-
fit others. Naive measures that fail to capture this lack of a "level playing
field" are of limited value to state policymakers.
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